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The "Different Voice" in Jewish Law:
Some Parallels to a Feminist Jurisprudencet
STEVEN F. FRIEDELL*
INTRODUCTION
Feminism and all feminist scholarship must address a central question:
Are women different from men?' Some feminists insist that women and
men are virtually the same and that the law should treat women the same
as men.2 The Equal Pay Act3 and Title VII4 are based on the assumption
that women are the same as men or at least ought to be treated as if no
essential differences exist between them. Other feminists focus on Carol
Gilligan's highly influential book, In a Different Voice, which suggests that
women tend to develop a distinct set of moral standards. Women, according
to Gilligan, see moral issues not in terms of rights and rules but in terms
of relationships and responsibilities. 5 Women develop a moral imperative
t © Copyright 1992 by Steven F. Friedell.
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University (Camden). B.A., 1971, Brandeis University; J.D.,
1974, The University of Michigan. The author wishes to thank N.E.H. Hull for her help and
encouragement and Donna Correll, Arnold Enker, Ann Freedman, Ellen Friedell, Kodzo
Kludze, Rabbi Allan Lazaroff, Michael Livingston, Craig Oren, Aviva Orenstein, and Allan
Stein for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks are also due to my
students in the seminar on Jewish law, especially to Ruth Anne Eisenberg, for stimulating
discussions on this topic.
Many of the sources on Jewish law cited in this Article are not available in translation. The
more important sources referred to in this Article that have been translated are THm BABYLONIAN
TALMUD (I. Epstein ed. 1935); THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES (1949); THE MINOR TRAcTATEs OF
THE TALMUD (1965). The Jerusalem Talmud is translated in a series called THE TALMUD OF
THE LAND OF ISRtAEL (1982-1991). Genesis Rabbah and Leviticus Rabbah are translated in
MIDRAsH RABBAH (1983). The most useful secondary source is THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA
(1972). For an overview of the development of Jewish law and its sources, see Rosenberg &
Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 955, 966-874 (1988). Two useful bibliographies of English materials are N. RAKOvER,
THE MULTI-LANGuAGE BmLIOGRAPHY OF JEWISH LAW (1990) and P. WEISBARD & D. SCHONBERG,
JEWISH LAW: BmLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES AND SCHOLARSHIP IN ENGLISH (1989). For a description
of traditional Jewish faith and practice, see H. WouK, Tins Is MY GOD (1959).
1. See Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 797 (1989).
2. B. FRIEDAN, Tim FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963); Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The
Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J.
871 (1971); see also Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook,
34 Am. U.L. REv. 1065, 1104 (1985) (Gender distinctions do not accurately describe people as
women and men.).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
5. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 100 (1982); see also N. NODDINGS, CARING: A
FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 24-25 (1984).
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of caring and strive to alleviate the trouble of the world. Women are more
likely than men to fear competitive situations and impersonal achievement.6
Gilligan also suggests that women are more likely to develop in this way
because in early childhood most girls and boys are raised primarily by
mothers. Boys therefore learn to develop a sense of themselves as separate
individuals whereas girls develop a sense of relatedness. 7
A number of people in the legal world have reacted to Gilligan's thesis
by suggesting ways in which law should change by incorporating her
insights.8 Legal procedures and substantive law would be restructured rad-
ically to resolve legal disputes more informally. Such a system would place
less emphasis on rules and precedents and place more emphasis on trying
to mend the relationships of the parties.9 Rather than search for a rule
applicable to all situations, judges ought to encourage solutions based on
the particular contexts and relationships.10 There should be greater emphasis
on mediation and encouraging parties to work out their differences after
coming to see the other's point of view." Judges should be less disinterested
and more connected to the parties and society. 2 Lawyers would be less
likely to adopt the advocacy model and would be more concerned with
6. C. GImAAN, supra note 5, at 42.
7. See id. at 7-9.
8. See, e.g., Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829 (1990); Bender, A
Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Cahn, A
Preliminary Feminist Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL Ermcs 23 (1990); Finley,
Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
CoLtJM. L. REv. 1118 (1986); Freedman, Feminist Legal Method in Action: Challenging Racism,
Sexism and Homophobia in Law School, 24 GA. L. REv. 849 (1990); Heilbrun & Resnik,
Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913 (1990); Karst, Woman's
Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations
on a Women's Lawyering Process, I BERKELEY WomEN's L.J. 39 (1985); Sherry, Civic Virtue
and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. Ray. 543 (1986); Spiegelman,
Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School Curriculum: The Logic of Jake's
Ladder in he Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 243 (1988); West, Jurisprudence
and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1988); Worden, Overshooting the Target: A Feminist
Deconstruction of Legal Education, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 1141 (1985).
Gilligan has also had her share of critics. Some have feared that Gilligan's analysis would
further stereotype women. See Williams, supra note 1. Others argue that women's "different
voice" is a product of male oppression of women. See C. MAcKINN N, FEmniisM UNMODIFID
38-39 (1987). MacKinnon says that men expect women to care for them and that reifying the
damage of sexism into differences is an insult to women's possibilities. Id. Other feminists
assume that both men and women are freely capable of speaking in the different voice. See
Frug, supra note 2. Others have criticized the validity of Gilligan's findings. See, e.g., Auerbach,
Blum, Smith & Williams, Commentary on Gilligan's In a Different Voice, I1 FEmINIST STUD.
149 (1985); Nails, Social-Scientific Sexism: Gilligan's Mismeasure of Man, 50 Soc. REs. 643
(1983). Despite such criticism, many feminists have adopted the Gilligan model as a normative
model. See Bartlett, supra, at 849.
9. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 52-53.
10. Sherry, supra note 8, at 582-83.
11. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 52.
12. See Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 8, at 1949-51.
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trying to aid the clients at arriving at a healthy solution to their problems. 3
Feminist jurisprudence would change tort law by deemphasizing the award
of damages. Instead, it would stress the need to prevent people from hurting
others and would impose duties on people who injure others to take active
responsibility for repairing that injury.1 4 As applied to business practices,
one would expect that a feminist jurisprudence would discourage cutthroat
competition and would encourage concern for one's customers, dealers, and
competitors.
The student of Jewish law probably recognizes that many of these
suggestions stemming from the work of Gilligan and others for reform of
the Anglo-American legal system exist in Jewish law as it developed in the
Talmud and post-Talmudic sources.' This Article will examine many of the
similarities. The presence of these similarities would be worthwhile if only
to elucidate the connection within Jewish law of a variety of seemingly
unrelated procedural and substantive rules and practices. But their presence
in Jewish" law may also be of value to individuals concerned with defining
and formulating a feminist critique of current Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. Some fear that Gilligan's approach could reinforce a stereotype of
women that might make it more difficult for them to advance in society.
Men would be able to justify their refusal to hire or promote women into
traditional male positions on the grounds that women are naturally unsuited
for those roles.1 6 One response is to assert that the legal system ought to
13. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 53.
14. Bender, supra note 8, at 37.
15. This point is mentioned by George Fletcher in the context of his discussion of the
Jewish law of care for others illustrated by the Jewish law of rescue. Fletcher, Ho and
Halakha, I S'vARA 13, 14 (1990); see also M. SAMUEL, THE G Ngam AND THE JEW (1950)
(contrasting the English gentlemen's "sporting formulation of life" to Judaism's moral
approach).
The Babylonian Talmud consists of two parts, the Mishna, which was compiled in Palestine
about the year 200 of the Christian Era, and the Gemara, which was completed in Babylonia
about 300 years later. The other main sources used in this Article are three codes: the Mishneh
Torah written by Maimonides (circa 1135-1204) the Tur written by Jacob ben Asher (circa
1270-1343), and the Shulhan Arukh written by Joseph Caro (circa 1488-1575). Each of these
sources is heavily supplemented by commentaries. The most important Talmudic commentaries
used in this Article are Rashi (circa 1040-1105), and the Tosafot, which is a collection of
dialectical comments on the text dating primarily from the 12th to the 14th centuries. Another
important kind of source used in this Article is the responsa literature, the case law of Jewish
jurisprudence.
Another work, known as the Palestinian Talmud or the Jerusalem Talmud, consists of the
Mishna with a Gemara that was completed in Palestine about 100 years before the completion
of the Babylonian Talmud. Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this Article to the
"Talmud" are references to the Babylonian Talmud.
Translations of passages in the Talmud that appear in this Article are based on Tn
BABYLoNiAN TALMUD (I. Epstein ed. 1935). Unless otherwise indicated, translations of other
material are by this author.
16. See Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
1992]
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value women's insights into moral problems and yet be vigilant against
using those insights to discriminate against women.' 7 But this response is
less than persuasive. There is no guarantee that women will not be further
stereotyped if Gilligan's theory is widely accepted.
The insights to be gained from Jewish law may be important to avoid
this stereotyping of women. Although Jewish law was developed almost
entirely by men,' 8 it nevertheless incorporated many of the ideals and
approaches that feminists of the Gilligan school would favor. This suggests
that the values of responsibility and caring are not necessarily the province
of women alone and are therefore not necessarily the result of an innate
psychology of young girls. American culture may have conditioned a dis-
proportionate number of women into adopting an ethic of caring and
discouraged a disproportionate number of men from adopting such an ethic.
But if so, the example of Jewish law would suggest that there is nothing
natural or inevitable in this process. Therefore, adoption of these goals by
feminists ought not stereotype women. And feminists who feel ambivalent
about proposing legal reforms that respond to the "different voice" can
take comfort in knowing that they are not alone in favoring law that would
promote responsibility and caring.
It may strike many as odd that Jewish law would offer insights and
values that parallel those of feminists. For Jewish law, although it values
and protects women, generally subordinates them.' 9 But when we examine
aspects of Jewish law that lie outside the regulation of relationships between
the sexes-such as matters of dispute resolution, legal representation, judicial
procedure, and substantive law relating to injuries and competition-we see
that Jewish law has much in common with the feminist approach.
The point of this Article is not to suggest that Jewish law is the only
source that parallels a feminist jurisprudence. Many of the values in feminist
jurisprudence may be found in any society that emphasizes the individual's
obligations to the community substantially more than American society
HAuv. L. REv. 1749 (1990); Williams, supra note 1. The concern is raised in part by cases
like EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. I11. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302
(7th Cir. 1988) (small number of women employed in commission sales jobs is not due to
unlawful discrimination but can be explained in part by tendency of women to prefer jobs
that do not involve cutthroat competition).
17. See Bender, supra note 8.
18. Women made a few contributions to the development of Jewish law. For example,
Beruryah, a woman in the second century, was an authority whose views on Jewish law and
thought were quoted approvingly in the Talmud and other sources. TOSEFrA Kelim Bava Metzia
1:6; TAMmuD Berakhot 10a. Jewish women are credited with having imposed stricter require-
ments on the delay required before going to the ritual bath after a period of menstruation.
TALMuD Niddah 66a.
19. See infra notes 181-92 and accompanying text.
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does. For example, Amish custom and practice, 2° customary African law,2'
and the law of some villages in colonial China exhibit many of these same
points. The primary reason for focusing on Jewish law is its extensive
written record, produced over the last two thousand years and covering
virtually every aspect of daily life in many countries and a variety of
cultures. That record not only preserves for us the voices of scholars long
since past but allows us to see the development, and in some cases the
decline, of the values of responsibility and caring. The conclusion of this
Article will discuss some of the implications of this similarity for Jewish
law and feminist jurisprudence.
ASPECTS OF JEWISH LAW
1. Compromise and Mediation
A common misperception of Jewish law is that it is overly legalistic.
Many assume that Talmudic law consists of many technical rules that are
developed without regard to justice.u The study of Jewish law can often
be highly technical and abstract. In the Talmudic period, roughly from the
beginning of the Christian Era to the year 500, certain rabbinical academies
employed rigorous study methods that often involved impractical hypothet-
ical situations.2 During the medieval period rabbis developed a study method
known as "pilpul," based on a word meaning "pepper." This method often
involves hair-splitting analysis,25 hardly the sort of approach favored by a
feminist jurisprudence. 26
20. See J. HOSTEMTLR, Amisa Socmry (3d ed. 1980). In Amish society members are expected
to know one another's problems and work to settle them, id. at 16-18; individuals are expected
to submit to the community will, id. at 85-86; members are not supposed to go to court, id.
at 252; and mutual aid is important, id. at 246.
21. T. E.IAS, THE NATURE Or AFRIcAN CusTomARY LAW 130, 272 (1956).
22. See Karst, supra note 8, at 490 n.166.
23. See, e.g., City of New York v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 739 F. Supp. 761,
770 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); People v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 533 N.E.2d 873, 879 (1988) (Clark, J.
concurring); Watson v. Commonwealth, 579 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Ky. 1979); People v. Barysh,
95 Misc. 2d 616, 408 N.Y.S.2d 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE
C~u1NAL LAW 66 (1982); L. TIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 396 (2d ed. 1988); see
also Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, 552 F. Supp. 841, 848 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (comparing
intellectual fascination of choice of law analysis to "pilpul" and warning about the need to
"avoid the trap of applying mechanistic rules").
24. For example, to determine if he deserved to be considered a scholar, Rabbi Dimi was
asked, "If an elephant swallows an osier basket and passes it out with its excrement, is it still
subject to ritual uncleanliness?" TALtmu Bava Batra 22a.
25. See 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Pilpul 524 (1972). Herman Wouk's character I. David
Goodkind describes the study of Talmud this way:
[U]nder the opaque Aramaic surface the Talmud is a magnificent structure of
subtle legal brilliancies, all interwoven with legend, mysticism, the color of ancient
times, and the cut-and-thrust of powerful minds in sharp clash. I can't get enough
of it, and I've been at it for decades.
H. Wouic, IN sIDE, Oursm 4 (1985).
26. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 8, at 850 (Feminist method destroys artificial dichot-
omies and rejects abstraction.).
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The hair-splitting analysis, which is a feature of the study of Jewish law,
is not a feature of its practice in litigated cases. Because Judaism views the
Torah27 as the will of God, the study of the Torah takes on a religious
dimension akin to prayer. 2 Pilpul, developed as the study of that law,
almost became an end in itself.29 Pilpul also helped the rabbis keep the
study fresh and harmonize seemingly contradictory statements in the law.30
By contrast, when rabbis applied Jewish law to the resolution of civil
disputes, they were not concerned with theoretical niceties. Instead, they
emphasized compromise. If parties failed to resolve their dispute by reaching
a settlement, the rabbis or others within the community would attempt to
mediate the dispute." If this failed to bring about a settlement, the law
required the judges or arbitrators to encourage the litigants to authorize the
panel to decide the case according to the method of compromise rather
than strict law.32 The method of compromise meant that the court would
decide the dispute through the exercise of discretion. 3 The court would, in
effect, resolve the dispute in a way that the parties might have resolved it
27. "Torah" is understood within the Jewish tradition to refer not only to the five books
of Moses, but also to the oral law, which is reflected in part in the Mishnah, Talmud, and
later sources. See TALMUD Berakhot 5a, translated infra note 126.
28. See, e.g., TALMUD Berakhot 8a (One ought to pray where one studies Torah, because
after the destruction of the Temple the only place that God has in this world is the four cubits
of the law.); TALMUD Berakhot 21b (One who teaches his son Torah is regarded as though he
had received it at Sinai.).
29. Professor Judith Plaskow correctly senses that Jewish law "has its religious origins in
the passion for relation" but criticizes that law for its attention to the alternate reality that it
creates. J. PLASKOW, STANDING AGAIN AT SINAI: JUDAISM FROM A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 68-70
(1990). She says, for example, "[I]n terms of the little girl penetrated before age three, what
is her horror and pain next to the question of how her marriage contract should be written?"
Id. at 70. Plaskow supports her criticism by reference to the writings of one of the great
Halakhic authorities of our time, Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik. In Soloveitchik's view, a person
steeped in Jewish law is a person whose primary goal is to see the world in categories and
concepts fashioned by the theoretical law. Such a person is less concerned with rendering
rulings based on that law. See J. SoLovrrc~m, HALAKIIc MAN 19-29 (1983). Plaskow is right
that the study of Jewish law can lead to the creation of an alternate reality. But as Soloveitchik
observed, a rabbi is sometimes compelled "to render practical decisions." Id. at 24. And in
its application to actual contested disputes, Jewish law displays most clearly its concern for
fostering relationships and community.
30. 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Pilpul 524, 525 (1972).
31. Jewish tradition traced the mediation process back to Aaron, the first High Priest. See
ETHICs OF THE FATHERS 1:12. It was said that when people quarrelled Aaron would go to each
of them and say how much the other regretted the argument. He would sit with them until
he had removed all rancor from their hearts. THE FATHERS ACCORDING TO RABBI NATHAN ch.
12; PEREK HA-sHALOM para. 18. He reconciled so many husbands and wives that legend says
that 80,000 children were named after him. See 3 L. GINZBERG, THE LEOENDS OF THE JEWS
329 (1954).
32. See SHuLnAN ARuKH Hoshen Mishpat 12:20. A court is praised if it always decides
cases based on compromise. MISHNEH TORAH Sanhedrin 22:4; SHULHAN ARuH Hoshen Mishpat
12:2. One authority wrote that a court is only praised if it renders a decision according to
compromise. RESPONSA SIMEoN BEN ZEMAR DURAN (circa 1361-1444) 1:47.
33. 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Compromise 857 (1972).
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had the parties been able to negotiate a compromise.14 The reason for this
practice was the belief that a decision under strict law could lead to justice
but not to peace;35 a decision that left one side losing everything would not
restore peace to the parties or the community. Peace and justice would be
possible only if the parties could each leave the court or arbitration with a
sense of having been treated fairly.3 6
The development of this attitude in Jewish legal culture was not without
dissent. There were apparently efforts in the Talmudic period to dilute the
effect of the commandment of judging according to compromise.37 Each
rabbi implemented the practice differently. Also, because the method of
compromise could not be imposed on the parties against their will,3" a single
litigant could always insist on a judgment according to strict law. But the
strong preference of the Jewish legal system in the post-Talmudic period
was to -avoid a formal trial according to strict law, and rabbis could often
34. In one of his recollections of his father's decisions, Isaac Bashevis Singer tells how his
father once heard a complicated case involving a large sum of money. Deciding the case
according to the principle of compromise, his father ordered an equal division, "his old and
tried formula." At first both sides derided the decision, but they soon agreed to accept it,
shook hands, and "were the best of friends." I. SINGER, IN My FATHER'S COUtT 40-41 (1966).
As Singer says, "The concept behind [the Jewish court] is that there can be no justice without
godliness, and that the best judgment is one accepted by all the litigants with good will and
trust in divine power." Id. at viii. For a discussion of modem day rabbinical courts, see Note,
Rabbinical Courts: Modern Day Solomons, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 49 (1970).
35. TALMUD Sanhedrin 6a. The Talmud says that Jerusalem was destroyed only because
people insisted on strict law. TALMUD Bava Metzia 30b. The Midrash teaches that God created
the world with the attributes of compassion and strict justice and that had it been created
with strict justice alone the world would not be able to stand. GENESIS RABBAH 12:15. God is
said to pray that His compassion will overcome His anger and that He will do more than
strict justice would allow. TALMUD Berakhot 7a. God is said to have made a compromise
between Isaiah and Hezekiah. TALmUD Berakhot 4b. Even Moses is said to have decided cases
according to compromise and to have appointed judges based in part on their ability to decide
cases by compromise. See 3 L. GINZBERG, supra note 31, at 67; J. LAUTERBACn, MEKILTA DE-
RABBI ISmHAaL 182 (1933). The rabbis also valued the compromise of disputes about proper
ritual as a way of promoting "peace between the scholars" and thereby preventing the
development of factions. See, e.g., TALMUD Berakhot 39b.
36. See A. KinscHENaAuM, EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW: HALAKmC PERSPECTIVES IN LAW 142-
43 (1991); Smui HARAv: A CONSPECTUS OF Tm PuBLIC LECTuRES OF RABBI JOSEPH B.
SoLovrrCHmK 82 (J. Epstein ed. 1974) [hereinafter SmuREI HARAv].
37. The Talmud records different points of view. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Jose the
Galilean, said that it was forbidden for a court to compromise and that a court ought to let
the "law cut through the mountain." By contrast, Rabbi Joshua ben Korcha said that it was
a commandment to try a case by compromise. A third anonymous rabbi took the intermediate
position that it was optional for a court to try a case by compromise. An additional view was
that a court could try the case by compromise only until the judges had formed an opinion
as to which side would win according to the strict law. The Talmud concludes its discussion
by suggesting that the law follows Rabbi Joshua ben Korcha, but this is interpreted to mean
only that at the beginning of a case the judge must ask the parties if they want their case
resolved by strict law or by compromise. TALmuD Sanhedrin 6b-7a.
38. In order for a decision by compromise to be binding on the parties, the parties had
to enter into an agreement authorizing the court to proceed on that basis. SHULAN AiuucH
Hoshen Mishpat 12:7.
1992]
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exert a great deal of moral persuasion to make the litigants agree to submit
their case for judgment based on compromise. 9
Compromise was especially encouraged where the law or facts were
unclear4° or where a party would be subject to an oath.41 Even if the parties
had submitted their case for resolution according to strict law, they could
change their minds and have it resolved by compromise up until the moment
when the verdict was announced. 42 And even after a verdict was announced
in a case tried according to strict law, members of the community43 or
possibly even one of the judges who tried the case 44 could try to persuade
the parties to accept a compromise.
The resolution of a case by compromise resembled superficially the
approach of many modern American courts of favoring out-of-court settle-
39. Joshua Falk emphasized that the judges are supposed to explain to the litigants that it
would be better for them to have the case decided by compromise, and the judges are to
"speak to their hearts" in the hopes that they will agree to that mode of trial. MEmAT EINAYIM
TO SmiAN ARuKn Hoshen Mishpat 12 n.6.
The standard submission agreements used by Jewish arbitrators have usually included a
provision granting the arbitrators the power to resolve the disputes according to compromise.
See H. GuAK, OzAR HA-sH'TARoT 281-86 (1926), translated in E. DoRF' & A. Rosarr, A
LIVING TREE 295-98 (1988). For a recent example of such an agreement, see Elmora Hebrew
Center, Inc. v. Fishman, 239 N.J. Super. 229, 232 n.2, 570 A.2d 1297, 1298 (App. Div. 1990),
aff'd 125 N.J. 404, 593 A.2d 725 (1991). According to the English translation prepared by
the rabbinical tribunal, the submission agreement authorized the panel of rabbis to "adjudicate
between us according to their judicious wisdom," and the parties agreed to accept the panel's
judgment "whether it be verdict or compromise." (The Hebrew original executed by the parties
contained the ancient formula "whether by strict law or by compromise close to strict law.").
The case involved a congregation's effort to discharge its rabbi based on serious charges of
impropriety. The panel decided in accordance with the principle of compromise. It awarded
the rabbi damages, but although it found no grounds for the rabbi's removal from the
congregation, "for the sake of peace" it concluded that he should leave his position within
two months after being paid the award. Id. at 230. The author wishes to express his thanks
to Russell M. Woods, attorney for Elmora Hebrew Center, for providing a copy of the
submission agreement and the decision of the Bet Din.
40. See, e.g., SHImiA ARuKH Hoshen Mishpat 12:5 (where facts are unclear); RESPONSA
RosH 107:6 (same); Gloss by Moses Isserles on SIIULHAN ARUiKI Even Ha-ezer 165:4 (where
the law is unclear); AIuK, RESPONSA Im i YosHER 2:147 (20th century), quoted in S. SHmo,
DINA DE-MALKHrA DINA 410 (1974) (same); see also 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAiCA Levirate'
Marriage and Halizah 122, 128 (1972).
41. See TosAFoT Sanhedrin 6b (comment beginning "Nigmar ha-din").
42. SHutA ARuKH Hoshen Mishpat 12:2.
43. Id. One might wonder why a winning side would agree to relinquish part of its award.
Perhaps not all litigants are interested in winning only money; some are more interested in
the satisfaction of having their claim vindicated in a neutral forum. Cf. Hoffer, Honor and
the Roots of American Litigiousness, 33 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 295 (1989) (Some people sue to
vindicate their sense of honor.).
44. See RESPONSA RAsHDAM TO SHULHAN ARauK Hoshen Mishpat 116; SHAKH TO SHUIHAN
AR U H Hoshen Mishpat 12 (comment 6); SmLTEi HA-GBoPim, Sanhedrin lb (commentary to
code by Alfasi). All of these authorities are based on an earlier opinion by Isaiah ben Elijah
di Trani (the Younger) (died circa 1280), who wrote that the judges could not impose the
compromise but could try to persuade the parties to accept it. The opinion was rejected by
other authorities. See Prrmi T'sHuvA COMMENT ON SHuuHN ARUICH Hoshen Mishpat 12.
[Vol. 6 :915
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ments, but it differed from that approach in that parties in American
settlement negotiations typically reach an agreement based on their views
of what is likely to happen if the case goes to trial. In reaching a settlement
each party discounts the costs of trial. Although the American settlement
buys peace, the quality of its justice is a reflection of the justice that would
be meted out at trial. By contrast, the compromise in Jewish law was a
method of trial by a court. The court would not base its compromise on
the risks of litigation but would attempt to heal the underlying dispute
between the parties and promote the welfare of the community.
In practice, then, Jewish law often accomplished many of the goals of a
feminist jurisprudence. The parties were encouraged to work out their
disputes by talking to each other and coming to an understanding of the
other side's point of view. 41 When this was not possible, rabbis or others
would attempt mediation. The mediator would try to have a heart-to-heart
talk with each side and try to remove the anger from each side. When this
failed, the judges or arbitrators would try to resolve the dispute so that
each side would walk away happy. In this way, the relationships between
the parties would stand a better chance of being healed than if the law
were strictly applied.
2. Cases of Strict Law Involving an Element of Compromise
Jewish courts outside of Palestine during. the Talmudic period lacked
authority to award damages in many kinds of cases.4 For example, personal
injury cases were deemed to be uncommon and therefore not subject to an
award of damages. The courts were not wholly without jurisdiction, how-
ever, over such cases. The courts could still render a verdict on the question
of liability. If the verdict was in favor of the plaintiff, the court would
place a ban on the defendant until he paid sufficient damages to satisfy
either the plaintiff or the court. 47 In addition, the plaintiff could resort to
self-help and seize the defendant's property subject to being ordered by the
court to restore part of it to the defendant. 48 The practical effect of these
cumbersome procedures was to enable the parties to negotiate. Having
already resolved the question of liability, the parties could determine, subject
to limited judicial supervision, the amount of damages that would be
adequate.
In other important respects, Jewish law allowed for flexibility in shaping
the law to fit the needs of the parties and the community. Jewish courts
45. Cf. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 51.
46. Smnau H A wKH Hoshen Mishpat 1:1-5, translated in E. Doa- & A. RosETT, supra
note 39, at 317-18.
47. A ban was a form of social ostracism that varied in scope over the centuries. See 8
ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Hereto 344, 350-55 (1972).
48. Id.
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and communities had emergency powers to prevent the breakdown of order
in the community. Jewish leaders acting under this potentially far-reaching
power were to do so "for the sake of Heaven. ' 49 More generally, rabbis
recognized that circumstances could often dictate the content of a rule of
law. There might be one rule of law to be announced in a public discourse,
a more lenient rule to be given in private to one who sought guidance, and
an even more lenient standard in the face of an actual practice. 0 In addition,
rabbis could tailor the rules of law to meet the needs of a particular case
and the individuals appearing before them. For example, a wicked individual
could be penalized by being made subject to a stricter rule, and less powerful
individuals could be aided by the court imposing a more lenient rule. 51
Thus, rabbis possessed significant discretion-even in cases that were decided
according to "strict law"-to fashion a rule that would do justice in the
individual case.
3. Avoidance of Formal Claims
A feminist jurisprudence based on Carol Gilligan's concept of the different
voice would tend to avoid using rules to resolve problems. Instead, it would
look more to the facts of each case. It would define problems not in terms
of rights but in terms of relationships.5 2 While Jewish law pursued these
goals by preferring compromise to adjudication according to strict law,
Jewish law also tried to achieve these goals by its abhorrence of statutes of
limitations and other formal pleadings that can mask the legitimacy of the
underlying claim.
Jewish law generally operated without a statute of limitations. 3 Courts
treated old claims as being more suspect, and a judge would look at them
more closely.54 But courts did not automatically bar claims if they were old.
49. SmuuaL A AaurKH Hoshen Mishpat 2, translated in E. Dourr & A. RosT, supra note
39, at 319.
50. TALmuD Taanit 26b-27a; TALMUD Nedarim 23b; see also RAsHi ON TAMbm' Berakhot
33b (comment beginning "Halakhah").
51. See, e.g., TALMUD Bava Kamma 96b; see also A. KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 36, at
86-98.
52. Cf. N. NoDDINGs, supra note 5, at 24 ("To care is to act not by fixed rule but by
affection and regard.").
53. See M. ELoN, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPL.S 110 (1973) (Hebrew); 11
ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Limitation of Actions 251 (1972). There were two exceptions, both
relating to widows. A widow's claim for the amount of money stipulated in the prenuptial
agreement-known as the ketubah-which becomes due upon divorce or upon the death of
the husband, was considered waived if not brought within 25 years. Her claim for maintenance
was considered waived if not brought within three years for rich widows and two years in the
case of poor widows.
54. E.g., REsPONSA ROSH 68:20; see also RESPONSA RASIDAM Hoshen Mishpat 367 (If a
court cannot find reason for delay in bringing suit by plaintiff's father before he died, it
ought to make a compromise.).
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By the seventeenth century, Jewish communities allowed defendants to plead
the lapse of time, but this only constituted a defense if the defendant also
denied the existence of the debt and took an oath to that effect.55 Thus, in
Jewish law a defendant could not defeat a meritorious claim merely by
asserting that the plaintiff had not brought the claim by a certain arbitrary
date. In this way, the law furthered its goal of ensuring that courts do real
justice, not formal justice.5 6
The same approach is evident in the way Jewish law handled the claims
of adverse possession. In Jewish law, occupation of land in an open and
notorious way for a number of years would not defeat the claim of one
who had evidence of ownership unless the occupant claimed to have acquired
the land by purchase, gift, or inheritance.5 7 By contrast, most American
jurisdictions recognize a right of adverse possession if a party without color
of title merely claims to own the land and occupies it in an open and
notorious manner for a number of years. 8
Jewish law's dislike of formal claims is also evident in the rule that a
judge was not to instruct a litigant that the opponent's claim was defective
because of the want of some formal requirement. For example, if a plaintiff
presented only one witness to support her claim, not the two required by
strict law, the court was not to instruct the defendant to object on those
grounds. The hope was that the defendant would admit to the plaintiff's
claim if that claim were valid. In that way, a true judgment would emerge.59
Thus, even in cases decided according to strict law, judges possessed a great
deal of discretion and power to see that the results in the cases corresponded
to real justice, not formal justice.
4. Qualifications for Judges
One way of checking the power of a court is to require that each case
be decided by a panel of at least two judges. Because men and women may
tend to see legal issues differently, one feminist scholar has suggested having
a panel consisting of one man and one woman. 60 Judges in the Jewish legal
system wielded enormous power. Their role was even more crucial when no
55. 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Limitation of Actions 251, 253 (1972); M. ELON, supra
note 53, at I11.
56. Another factor may be that statutes of limitations are inconsistent with a system that
values compromise and negotiation, for there ought not to be an arbitrary limit on the parties'
ability to negotiate an amicable settlement.
57. TALmuD Bava Batra 41a; MIISHNEH TORAH To'en 14:12; SHULHAN ARUKH Hoshen
Mishpat 146:9.
58. See 3 THE AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.4(c) (1952).
59. MisHNEH TORAH Sanhedrin 21:10. If the judge sees that the litigant is trying to state
a valid claim but cannot express it correctly, the judge may help him a little but must be very
careful not to play the part of lawyer. Id. at 21:11.
60. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 52 n.75.
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attorneys were present.6 ' Jewish law guarded against the abuse of this power
by requiring Jewish courts normally to consist of three judges.62 Verdicts
in cases tried according to strict law needed to be decided by a majority
vote; verdicts in compromise cases had to be unanimous. 3 In this way
Jewish law effectively guarded against any one judge wielding too much
control.
Within feminist jurisprudence there is discussion of an ideal judge as one
who sees judging as an act of responsibility. The male ideal of a judge is
one who is dispassionate, disinterested, disengaged, and independent. The
female judge is the opposite: she is related, dependent, embedded, and
interconnected. 64 How do the requirements of a judge under Jewish law
measure up? The most obvious difference between Jewish law and a feminist
jurisprudence is that Jewish law did not allow women to be judges. 65
61. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
62. A single individual could preside if the parties agreed. SnuLHAi ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat
3:2. Parties could choose to submit their cases to an ad hoc panel of arbitrators, and regular
courts were presided over by rabbis appointed by the community.
Cases decided by compromise would not be valid unless there was a formal agreement
witnessed by two persons, and normally the panel would witness the submission. Thus panels
hearing arbitration cases usually consisted of at least two members, although there were some
opinions that a panel of even one arbitrator could suffice. See SluuHIAN ARuKH Hoshen
Mishpat 12:7. Parties could request panels larger than three, for it was considered that the
greater the number of judges the greater the truth that would emerge from the case. GLoss
3Y MosEs ISSERLES TO SmHUFA ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 13:1; see also Smn.HAN ARUKH
Hoshen Mishpat 3:4 (It is praiseworthy to have more than three judges.).
63. SmULHAN ARuKH Hoshen Mishpat 3:2.
64. Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 8, at 1949-51. The American Bar Association criteria
for evaluating candidates for judicial office mention "compassion" as one character of ajudge. See AMERIcAN BAR A., STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND
How IT WORKS 4 (1988); JUDICIAL ADm. Div., AMERICAN BAR A., GUIDELINEs FOR REvTwiNG
QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES FOR STATE JUDICIAL OFFICE para. 4 (1988). The American Bar
Association standards also require candidates for state judicial office to be humble. Id. Others
who have written on the ABA standards have not referred to these elements. See Thomas,
The ABA and the Federal Judicial Section: A Proud Tradition Under Attack, 72 A.B.A. J.
6 (Nov. 1986) (focus is on legal competence, integrity, and judicial temperament). Judge
Kaufman of the Second Circuit said that a judge is "a paragon of virtue, an intellectual Titan,
and an administrative wizard." He recognized that one would more likely have to settle for
someone who had a sense of openness consistent with our tradition of giving each side a say.
Castle, How Should Supreme Court Justices Be Selected?, 71 A.B.A. J. 132 (Mar. 1985).
65. SHULHAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 7:4; JERUSALEM TALMUD Yoma 6:1. The Bible
describes Deborah as one who "judged" and as one to whom the Israelites came for
"judgment." Judges 4:4-5 (King James Version and Revised Standard Version). This apparently
caused some rabbis to conclude that women were eligible to become judges. See COMMENTARY
OF THE RITVA TO TALMUD Kidushin 35a (R. Yom Toy ben Abraham Ishbili, circa 1250-1330);
SEFER HA-HINUKH 77 (anonymous work probably dating from the 13th century) (indicating
the view of others). In some of the Tosafot, the possibility is mentioned that Deborah was a
judge and that women are eligible to be judges. See TALMUD Niddah 50a (comment beginning
"Kol Ha-kasher" (first answer)). But other comments by the Tosafot suggest that Deborah
was special in that she possessed divine inspiration and so was accepted by them as judge or
that she did not really act as a judge at all but only instructed others in the law. See TOSAFOT
ON TALMUD Bava Kamma 15a (comment beginning "Asher"); TosAFOT ON TALMUD Shevuot
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However, Jewish law had certain criteria for a good judge that are
consistent with feminist values. For example, the Talmud teaches that only
fathers could become members of the Sanhedrin. 6 Further, a very old man
could not be on the Sanhedrin, for, as Rashi explains, he would have
"forgotten the pain of raising children and so would not be compassion-
ate." 67 One who did not have children might turn out to be cruel. 68 Fathers
who knew first hand the "pain of raising children" would be more likely
to empathize with people.
Jewish law did not require lower court judges to be parents, but it did
expect them to be compassionate. Jewish law listed the following seven
qualifications for such judges: wisdom, humility, fear of God, hatred of
unjust gain, love of truth, respected and upstanding reputation. 69 "Respect"
did not refer to the respect that is given to someone because of his power
or high position. Quite the opposite. As Maimonides explained, the source
of respect for judges must be "their concern for the welfare of others, their
humility, the pleasantness of their company, and their gentle speech and
29b (comment beginning "Shevuat Ha-edut"); TosAFoT ON TALMUD Gitin 88b (comment
beginning "Velo"); TALMUD Yevamot 45b (comment beginning "Mi lo tavla"). This approach
was adopted by Jacob ben Asher in the Tur, who wrote that Deborah only instructed the
judges. TuR Hoshen Mishpat 7:5.
Many modern Bible scholars observe, based on comparison to other Semitic languages, that
the Hebrew word for "judge"-"shofet"-also meant ruler. E.g., L. KOEHLER & W. BAUM-
GARTNER, LEXICON IN VErEmls TESTAmENTI LIBRos 1003 (1958); F. BROWN, S.R. DRIVER & C.
BRIGos, A HEBREW AND ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 1047 (1907); see also JEWISH
PUBLICATION SOC'Y, TANAKH: A NEW TRANSLATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ACCORDING TO
THE TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT 377 n.* (1985). The new translation by the Jewish Publication
Society therefore translates Judges 4:4-5 to mean that Deborah "led" her people and that
they came to her for "decisions." But other modern scholars conclude, either because of
Judges 4:5 or because of her role as a prophet, that Deborah actually did act as a judge.
E.g., Y. KAUFMANN, SEFER SHOFETIM 122 (1964); see 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Deborah 1429,
1430 (1972). The issue for our purposes, however, is what the rabbis in the premodern period
understood the word to mean. There is some indication that at least some of these rabbis may
also have understood the term to mean "leader." See COMMENTARY OF THE RrrvA TO TALMUD
Kidushin 35a, supra; COMMENTARY OF RABBENU NissiM TO ALFAsI's CODE BEGINNING OF CHAPTER
4 OF SHEVUOT (circa 14th century) (alternative interpretation).
Whatever her role, be it judge, teacher, prophet, or chieftain, some within the Conservative
movement of Judaism have used the example of Deborah as a basis for the ordination of
women rabbis. See Gordis, The Ordination of Women, in THE ORDINATION OF WOMEN AS
RABBIS: STUDIES AND REsPONSA 47, 65 (S. Greenberg ed. 1988); Roth, On the Ordination of
Women as Rabbis, in id. at 127, 164-65.
66. The Sanhedrin was the supreme court and legislative body of the Jewish people during
Roman times.
67. RASRi ON TALMUD Sanhedrin 36b (comment beginning "Zaken"). The rule is codified
in MISHNEH TORAH Sanhedrin 2:3. Chapter 7 of the TOSEFrA, a collection of earlier teachings,
said that a childless person could hear monetary cases but not capital cases.
68. MISHNEH TORAH Sanhedrin 2:3.
69. Id. at 2:7, as translated in J. ROTH, THE HALAICHC PROCESS: A SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS
144-45 (1986). The list is based on the qualifications that Moses sought in appointing lower
judges: men of valor, God-fearing men, men of truth, haters of unjust gain, Exodus 18:21,
and wise and understanding men, known within your tribes, Deuteronomy 1:13.
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dealings with their fellow men. ' 7 0 Maimonides also explained that "one
who hates unjust gain" means one who is not anxious about his own money
and does not pursue the amassing of money.7' The law did not require that
all judges possess all seven traits. But a community was to strive to appoint
courts of three judges that collectively would have all seven.72 Jewish law,
then, expected a judge or at least a panel of judges to be compassionate,
humble, and concerned about fellow human beings.
The Jewish religion imposed an awesome responsibility on judges. Ac-
cording to Jewish thought, if a judge decided a case correctly, he would
cause the Divine presence to dwell on the Jewish people, and he became,
as it were, a "partner" with God in the creation of the world by restoring
order. But if the judge erred, he caused the Divine presence to depart from
the Jewish people and was liable in a heavenly court to pay with his life.
He was to act "as if a sword were resting over his neck and that hell was
open beneath his feet." 7 3 Like the ideal judge in feminist jurisprudence, the
Jewish judge was expected to see his task as one of responsibility to repair
the breaches within the community.
Jewish law expected judges to be independent. Jewish law expected judges
to scrupulously avoid any gift, honor, or courtesy that might even remotely
suggest that the judge would be biased in favor of someone's cause.74 But
a fundamental requirement of judging was to be in touch with the practical
needs of everyday life. A court was not to impose a requirement on people
that would make life unbearably difficult. 75 Jewish law also expected a
judge to be a spiritual leader and someone who filled the "total spectrum
70. Id. This is consistent with the statement in THE ETmIcs OF THE FATHERs 4:1: "Who is
worthy of honor? He who respects his fellow-men." J. HERTZ, DAILY PRAYER BOOK 667
(1960).
71. MIsHsEH TORAH Sanhedrin 2:7.
72. COmmmNTARY OF RADBAZ TO MISmsaH TORAH Sanhedrin 2:7 (circa 1479-1573).
73. MISHSIH TORAH Sanhedrin 24:8-9. Perhaps more pointedly, the Talmud says he is to
act as if the sword were placed between his flanks. MisaHl TORAH Sanhedrin 7a.
74. The Talmud recounts that a litigant helped Samuel get out of a boat, thereby
disqualifying Samuel from his case; another man removed a bird (or according to Maimonides,
he removed a bird's feather) from Amemar's head and thereby disqualified Amemar; Mar
Ukvah disqualified himself when a certain man covered up some spit that was in front of
him; R. Ishmael disqualified himself when one of his sharecroppers who used to bring him a
basket of fruit every Friday once brought it on a Thursday instead. TALmUD Ketubot 105b;
MIsmEH TORAH Sanhedrin 23:3. The Tosafot says that the above examples were situations
where individual judges were more scrupulous than the law required.
75. This was the rule as to legislation. See MisHaNH TORAH Mamrim 2:5 (A new law
should not be made unless most of the people will be able to tolerate it.). This was also a
principle applied in deciding cases. For example, the Rashdam, Samuel ben Moses de Medina,
one of the leading authorities of the 16th century, upheld the validity of all agreements,
including marital agreements, made by Jews who were forced to convert to Christianity but
who later escaped to countries where they were able to practice Judaism openly. In part his
reason was that otherwise one would not be allowing these Jews to live, echoing the dictum
in TALMUD Bava Kamma 91b. RESPONSA RASHDAm TO SHuLHAN AiuwH Hoshen Mishpat 327;
see also TOSAFOT ON TALmuD Bava Metzia 39b (comment beginning "Sheyatsa").
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of human relationships beginning with leadership and leading to love." '7 6
The picture of the ideal Jewish court that emerges from the classical
sources was a panel of God-fearing men who loved and cared for people.
They were humble. They were not self-centered people, nor did they become
judges because they had amassed great wealth and fame. The act of judging
was at its best the fulfillment of a religious responsibility for restoring and
creating order in the world. This seems to be consistent with the feminist
ideal of a judge who sees herself as interconnected with others and who
feels that judging is a responsibility.77
5. Reason and Intuition
Feminists assert that the male concept of justice is based on objective
reasoning whereas the female concept relies more on experience, context,
intuition, and subjective judgment.7 8 The post-Talmudic Jewish law devel-
oped along lines that parallel the feminist viewpoint.
The Bible seemed to require that cases could be resolved in court only
by the testimony of two witnesses.7 9 On its face, this rule of evidence
allowed no room for intuition or subjective judgment. But Jewish law
gradually developed far from this formal rule. Beginning in the Talmudic
period, judges had slightly more power to evaluate the weight of the
testimony. 0 A judge in this period could shift the burden of taking an oath
from the defendant to the plaintiff if the judge had good reason to believe
that the defendant was untrustworthy. 8 The Talmud also allowed judges to
use their judgment in deciding whether property in the possession of a poor
man at his death was his own or was merely on deposit. Judges were also
empowered to use their judgment in deciding the intention of someone who
had made a gift as to the identity of the donee and as to whether the gift
was intended to be absolute or conditional.8 2 But if a judge believed that a
plaintiff was fabricating a claim, the judge's only recourse was to recuse
himself.83 This would not preclude a subsequent action before a different
judge.84
76. See the remarks of Rabbi Soloveitchik in SiuiRai HARtv, supra note 36, at 83.
77. The call within feminist jurisprudence for judges who would appreciate the meaning
of law within an interdisciplinary context, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 59, is echoed
to some extent by the requirement in Jewish law that judges possess an understanding of
worldly matters that might come before them. Mism H ToRAH Sanhedrin 2:1.
78. See e.g., Freedman, supra note 8, at 850; Karst, supra note 8, at 500; Schneider, The
Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 589, 602 (1986); Sherry, supra note 8.
79. Deuteronomy 19:15.
80. See Enker, Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law (A Review-Essay), 4 DINt ISRAEL 107,
112-13 (1973).
81. TALmuD Ketubot 85a.
82. See TALMUD Ketubot 85b; TALmuD Bava Batra 146b.
83. TALMUD Shevuot 30b.
84. MisHnEH ToRAH Sanhedrin 24:3.
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In the post-Talmudic period, judges took a more active role in the trial
process to guarantee justice. They were willing to rely more on intuition,
experience, and subjective judgment. For example, one of the great au-
thorities of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, Asher ben
Jehiel, also known as the Rosh, ruled that if he believed that a plaintiff
had fabricated a claim he would issue a writ that no judge is to handle the
matter and give the writ to the defendant.8" Moreover, the Rosh ruled that
because judges have an overriding responsibility "to make peace in the
world" they have discretion to decide a case based on what they believe to
be the truth even if there is no reason or proof.s6 In making this far-
reaching pronouncement, the Rosh relied in part on the famous story of
King Solomon. In the story, King Solomon had to decide which of two
prostitutes who came before him, each claiming to be the mother of a
child, was the real mother.87 According to the Rosh, Solomon judged, in
his estimation and without formal proof, that one of the women had
compassion for the child. He therefore gave her the living child. The
Solomon story is a powerful one, open to many interpretations. Gilligan
uses the story of the two women as an example of how a woman could be
willing to sacrifice the truth to save a child in contrast to Abraham, who
was willing to sacrifice his son for what he believed was the truth." The
Rosh, looking at the story from the viewpoint of a judge, saw Solomon's
85. RESPONSA ROSH 68:20.
86. REsPONSA ROSH 107:6. Asher ben Jehiel lived from 1250 until 1327. Educated in France
and Germany, he moved to Spain in 1303 to escape persecution. In the responsum cited above,
the Rosh wrote that judges can base their decision on the judges' own view of the matter
where it cannot be clarified by proofs and testimonies, sometimes by judicial estimation and
sometimes according to a compromise. In the particular case the defendant raised a defense
which, when examined in the light of his answers to interrogatories, seemed to the judge to
be improbable. Maimonides had similarly concluded that judges could decide monetary cases
based on their own judgment of what was true. MIsHNEH TORAH Sanhedrin 24:1; see also A.
KItSCHENBAuM, supra note 36, at 81-82; 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Arbitration 294 (1972).
In the responsum mentioned above, the Rosh significantly distinguished and practically
overruled the Talmudic enactment that extensive cross-examination of witnesses could only
take place in capital cases, not in civil cases. See TALMUD Sanhedrin 32a (bottom of page).
He said that the Talmudic rule did not apply to cases where the defendant had resorted to
trickery and false claims and that in such cases cross-examination was appropriate. REsPONSA
ROSa 107:6.
87. 1 Kings 3:16-28. As recounted in the Book of Kings, two women who lived in the
same house had given birth at about the same time to sons. One night, one of the children
died. The women both claimed to be the mother of the living child. King Solomon ordered
that the living child be cut in two so that each woman might take half. One of the women
pleaded with Solomon to save the baby and let the other woman have him. The other woman
insisted that the King's order be carried out. The King ordered that the child be given to the
woman who had shown compassion and declared her to be the child's mother.
88. C. GnmuGAN, supra note 5, at 104-05. Another interpretation is that Solomon selected
the better mother, not the biological mother. Colb, Words That Deny, Devalue, and Punish:
Judicial Responses to Fetus Envy, 72 B.U.L. REv. (forthcoming).
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ability to overcome the requirements of strict proof where his sense of
justice dictated otherwise.
6. The Reluctance to Use Attorneys in Jewish Law
By limiting the use of attorneys, Jewish law enhanced the degree of
discretion that courts and arbitrators had to resolve disputes. In the Tal-
mudic period, a rabbi was generally precluded from giving legal advice to
a person engaged in a dispute. One concern was that lawyers might teach
one of the litigants how to lie. 9 But a rabbi was to be very cautious about
advising a party who seemed to make a legitimate claim. 9° Such advice
could harm another person and might prevent the parties from resolving
their disputes according to their own sense of fairness. The Talmud made
an exception to enable one to help one's own relative, because one owes a
greater allegiance to a relative than to a stranger. But even this exception
did not authorize a great rabbi to aid his relative. The Talmud records two
instances where great rabbis aided their relations only to regret having done
so. 9' A great rabbi ought not to stoop so low.
Similarly, in the Talmudic period parties could not have lawyers appear
with them in court. The only way in which attorneys could appear in court
was if they received an assignment of the claim from the plaintiff.92
Defendants in the Talmudic period could not assign their defense to an
attorney. Some Talmudic authorities looked askance at attorneys, applying
to them the verse in Ezekiel that they are like him "who did that which is
not good among his people." 93 The reason, explained Rashi, the great
commentator of the eleventh century, was that an attorney might be less
willing than a client to make a compromise with the other side. 94 A client
89. See RESPONSA RrVAsH 235 (circa 1326-1408) (An attorney ought not to be appointed
for a criminal defendant until after the court has had an opportunity to obtain his confession
because the attorney might teach the defendant how to lie.). This also seems to be the point
of the account of the Jerusalem Talmud that Rabbi Johanan gave advice to one of his female
relatives because he knew that she was telling the truth. JERUSALEM TALMUD Ketubot 4:10;
JERUSALEM TALMUD Bava Batra 9:4. The Ethics of the Fathers, a tractate of the Mishna,' says
that one ought not to act like the "orchei hadayanim." ETHIcs OF THm FATHERS 1:8. One
interpretation of this saying is that "orchai hadayanim" means lawyers. The Jerusalem Talmud
asked how Rabbi Johanan could have acted consistent with that dictum. Apparently the same
story is recounted in the Babylonian Talmud, but there Rabbi Johanan later regrets having
given the advice. TALMUD Ketubot 52b; see also TALMUD Ketubot 86a.
90. See Co NtirARY OF MAIMoNIDEs TO Enucs OF THm FATHERS 1:8.
91. TALMtD Ketubot 52b & 86.
92. For a discussion of some of the points raised in this section, see 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
JUD~ACA Attorney 837 (1972); Friedell, Legal Ethics and the Jewish Tradition, 52 RECONSTRUC-
TIONIST 20 (March-April 1987); Frimer, The Role of the Lawyer in Jewish Law, 1 J. OF LAw
& RELIGION 297 (1983).
93. Ezekiel 18:18.
94. CoM mTrARY ON TALMUD Shevuot 31a (comment beginning "Ze ha-ba be-harsha'a").
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might know of some other claim that the defendant had against him, or
the client might have some other moral reason for agreeing to a compromise
that would preserve the relationship between the parties. 95
Some post-Talmudic authorities explained that the purpose of having the
parties appear in court unaided by counsel was to make it less likely that
the parties would lie. The assumption was that few people would have the
audacity to lie while facing their opponent in front of a religious court.96
A lawyer, who might not know the truth of the matter, would be less likely
to tell the truth. Alternatiely, lawyers might not appreciate the relationship
between the parties and the significance of the dispute within that relation-
ship. Lawyers, therefore, might be more inclined to press a case harder
than their clients would. When lawyers are involved in the resolution of a
dispute, the dispute is less likely to result in a solution that would heal the
wounds between the parties. 97
An important exception to this rule was that an attorney was allowed to
represent a plaintiff who was unable to successfully bring the claim either
because the defendant was far away or because the plaintiff lacked the skill
to fashion the pleadings adequately. In such circumstances, acting as an
attorney was not only permitted, it was also considered to be the fulfillment
of the "mitzvah" of relieving an oppressed person.9
After the close of the Talmudic period, the pressures for allowing more
general use of attorneys gradually overcame most of the earlier resistance.
In the course of time, both plaintiffs and defendants regularly were allowed
95. See COMMENT OF THE MAHAnSHAH TO TALmuD Shevuot 31a (Rabbi Samuel Edels, circa
1555-1631).
96. See MEtrAT EINAYIM TO SsLHAN ARuKH Hoshen Mishpat 124 (applying this factor to
explain why a defendant could not appoint an attorney). There was a legal presumption that
a defendant who was being sued for failure to pay a debt would not have the nerve to deny
the debt when confronted in court by the creditor who had lent the money (without interest)
in order to help the boriower. Joshua Falk, author of the commentary, explains that plaintiffs
were permitted to assign their cases to an attorney because a plaintiff, not necessarily having
a prior relationship with the defendant, would not be presumed to be telling the truth. The
explanation offered does not explain why defendants in other types of situations, such as tort
cases, would be denied an attorney, for in 'these other types of situations there would be no
presumption that the defendant's denial would be truthful. It seems that one of the effects,
if not one of the purposes, of denying an attorney to defendants and the reluctance with
which the Talmud allowed plaintiffs to assign cases to attorneys was to maximize the chance
that parties would tell the truth and settle their claims amicably.
97. In capital cases, Jewish law allowed defendants to have attorneys. The reason for the
distinction was that all were under a religious obligation to save a human life, and the courts
were compelled to listen to anyone who offered to speak in the defendant's behalf. But here,
too, there was concern that lawyers would teach their clients to lie. See R.SPONSA RiVASH 235.
98. "Mitzvah" means commandment. TosAFoT Shevuot 31a (comment beginning "Ze haba
be-harsha'ah") indicates that one who collects money owed to people who are unable to collect
it themselves performs mitzvah. Joseph Caro, author of the SmUrN ARUII, explains that
the mitzvah is to relieve oppressed persons of their burden. Bzrr YosEr To TuR Hoshen
Mishpat 123.
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to assign their cases to attorneys.9 This was especially true in Spain and
Italy. ° ° Several other communities as late as the nineteenth century still
retained some limitations on the types of cases in which attorneys could
participate. Sometimes communities restricted attorneys to representing wid-
ows, orphans, or relatives. 10' In a few communities, rabbis actually encour-
aged parties to retain counsel in domestic relations cases. The theory was
that in such cases the parties might be unable to overcome their animosity
and that the lawyers might promote settlement. 0 2 In Israel today, the usual
practice in the Rabbinical courts is to allow lawyers to appear in court but
to require the parties themselves to begin their own pleading. 03
The decline of the Talmudic ideal regarding the use of attorneys weakened
the ability of Jewish courts and arbitrators to aid parties to resolve their
disputes amicably. There is no guarantee that Jewish law, like any other
dynamic body of law, will always improve. But some Jewish communities
retained much of the Talmudic ideal, and courts retained other ways of
securing compromise and compassion.
7. A Controlled Market
The discussion until now has focused on procedural aspects of Jewish
law that fostered responsibility. The remainder of this part of the Article
will show that the same goals were pursued by the substantive aspects of
Jewish law.
A hallmark of feminism is that men tend to see the world as a forum
where individuals engage in a contest of rights. By contrast, women tend
to see people as members of a network of interdependent relationships.
°4
As applied to the commercial world, the male view is compatible with a
free market economy where competition is good, provided only that the
competitors play according to the rules. A feminist viewpoint focuses more
on fostering a caring relationship between buyers, sellers, and competitors.
The Jewish view resembled the feminist outlook. Jewish law sought to
prevent sellers from charging more than a fair price and to prevent buyers
99. See, e.g., 3 RESPONsA RAsHBA 141 (Facts show that an attorney was hired to regularly
represent a certain client in both Jewish and non-Jewish courts.); see also TosAror To TALMUD
Kidushin 3a (comment beginning "Ve-Isha") (Rabenu Tam, the leading Tosafist of the 12th
century, would regularly give a power of attorney to a non-Jew even though non-Jews could
not act as ordinary agents under Jewish law.).
100. S. AsAF, BATEI HADIN VESiDREIHEM AH.AREI HATjmAT HA-TAImui 96 (1925).
101. Id. at 98. In some Jewish communities in Turkey, a party could appoint an attorney
only if the other side did so. N. RAKOVER, THE JEWISH LAW OF AOENCY IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
342-43 (1972) (Hebrew). In modem Israel, the failure of a court to allow a party to have an
attorney is not necessarily a grounds for appeal. See Frimer, supra note 92, at 302 (discussing
a case where a husband in a support case was not allowed to have an attorney).
102. N. RAKOVER, supra note 101, at 343.
103. See id. at 347.
104. C. GI.uoAN, supra note 5, at 27-29.
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from paying less than a fair price. The Talmud gave parties who were
mistaken as to the fair price the ability to rescind a transaction or to reform
it when the price worked out between the parties diverged by more than a
sixth from the fair price.'0 5 Furthermore, even when both sides to a trans-
action were not mistaken as to the fair price, Jewish law forbade a seller
from a making a profit of more than one sixth in essential commodities.' °6
In addition, Jewish courts and communities were authorized to fix prices
and wages for these commodities.'°7 A person who violated these standards
violated the Biblical command "that thy brother may live with thee."'0 8
Similarly, Jewish law prohibited an individual from hoarding goods bought
in the market, because hoarding would drive up the price. In times of
famine, people who grew produce were not permitted to retain it for more
than a year.'19 Not only did Jewish law require a seller not to deceive a
buyer about defects in the goods purchased, but the seller was prohibited
from deceiving a buyer by making it appear that the buyer was being given
special consideration."0
In these ways, Jewish law curbed the desire to pursue self-interest and
promoted assistance to the community. It is similar to a feminist approach
in that Jewish law created an atmosphere where commercial transactions
were not simply an opportunity for each side "to make a killing." One
could not take advantage of another's ignorance or inability to bargain.
The selling of necessary products was an activity that involved responsibilities
for the community's welfare. Jewish law prevented sellers and buyers from
treating each other as objects in order to advance their own interests. The
law would lead sellers and buyers to treat each other as related individuals
and to be concerned for each other's well-being.
The Jewish law regulating competition reflected the tensions caused by
sellers' needs to make a livelihood, buyers' needs for lower prices, and the
community's need for stable commercial relationships. According to the
majority view in the Talmud, merchants could lower prices below the market
price in the absence of a price fixed by the community."' Similarly, the
majority of the rabbis allowed a seller to provide "free" presents of nuts
or almonds to entice children to do business with them. The majority
reasoned that competitors could meet the lower prices and the benefits of
lower prices outweighed the risk of harm to other sellers. The concern of
105. TALmuD Bava Metzia 50b. For discrepancies of more than a sixth, the transaction was
voidable; for discrepancies of exactly a sixth, the amount of the overcharge was returnable.
See also 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAiCA Sale 676 (1972).
106. See 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Hafka'at She'arim 1061 (1972).
107. SHuLHAN ARuKH Hoshen Mishpat 231:27.
108. Levicticus 25:36; see 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Hafka'at Shearim 1062.
109. SHuLHAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 231:24.
110. SHuLHAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 228:6.
111. TALUuD Bava Metzia 60a.
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the dissenting view was that these practices would cause buyers to become
regular customers of the particular seller and deprive the other sellers of
their livelihood.' 2 In the post-Talmudic period some authorities allowed
only sellers of grains and produce to lower prices. They prohibited all other
merchants from doing so as it would harm their competitors." 3 The approach
of Jewish law was similar to a feminist outlook in that it permitted
individuals to lower prices only after considering the needs of the community
and balancing these needs against the potential harm to the other sellers.
The interest in protecting a merchant's livelihood took on greater impor-
tance when the issue became the right of a merchant to exclude new
merchants from entering the market. Again the Talmud records differing
opinions, but the majority view allowed some restrictions on the entry of
a new competitor who was an "outsider.""14 Although new competition
might lower prices, it would also interfere with existing relationships and
might harm the livelihood of the existing merchant. The complex set of
rules that developed sought to balance these conflicting interests." 5 When
the new competitor was from the same town, the interests in allowing new
competition were stronger, because doing so would benefit the community
and a member of it. But when the new competitor was from a different
town or country, the interest in maintaining a stable set of relationships
took on greater importance. In some Jewish communities, a craftsman was
entitled to a monopoly over his non-Jewish customers." 6 In this instance
112. Id.; see also RAsm oN TALMUD Bava Meizia 60a (comment beginning "Ve-lo yifhot et
ha-sha'ar").
113. N. RAKOVER, COMMERCE IN JEWISH LAW 34 (1987) (Hebrew); J. EpsTEIN, ARuKH HA-
SmM.LiN, ORAH HAYyxm 228:14 (1893). The sale of grains and produce was distinguished
because it was thought that wholesalers could meet lower prices. Some authorities allowed
merchants to lower prices of all goods provided that they did not sell below a competitor's
cost or otherwise engage in unfair competition. N. RAXKOVER, supra at n. 126. In Talmudic
times a substantial drop in prices was seen as a crisis requiring the community to offer special
prayers even on the Sabbath. TALMuD Bava Batra 91a.
114. See TALmtuD Bava Batra 21b.
115. In the Shulhan Arukh, Joseph Caro states that a merchant could not exclude a
competitor from entering business in the same alleyway or courtyard even if the competitor
lived in another part of town. But if the competitor were from another country, he could be
excluded unless he paid the king's tribute. SMANutai ARUKH Hoshen Mshpat 156:5. The gloss
on this section by Moses Isserles, however, gives greater power to the first resident and to his
fellow residents to exclude new competition. When the new competitor is from the same town,
Isserles says that many authorities allow the residents of the alleyway or courtyard, but not
the individual merchant, to exclude the competitor. When the new competitor is from another
town, the first merchant can exclude him from entering business in the same alleyway or
courtyard but cannot exclude him from entering business in another part of town. The citizens
of the town can, however, exclude him from entering business anywhere in the town. Isserles
further records that others allow the first merchant to exclude a new competitor from another
town until the latter acquires a house and pays taxes not only to the king but to the ruler of
the town. GLoss oF MOSES ISSERLES TO SHULnAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 156:5.
116. GLOSS OF MosEs IssERLES To SmnLnAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 156:5; see 11 ENCY-
CLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Ma'arufya 640, 641 (1972).
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the interest of the Jewish craftsman was strong compared to a weak interest
of the Jewish community as a whole. Jewish law recognized the right to
unrestrained competition in one area-the teaching of Torah." 7 The value
of this basic service to the community simply outweighed any other consid-
eration.
The approach of Jewish law to prevent new competition was similar to
a feminist outlook. Jewish law considered the value to the community of
lower prices that might result in allowing new competitors to enter the
market. But it balanced this need against the desire to protect existing
relationships and the desire to protect the livelihood of existing sellers.
Jewish law was sensitive to the concern that new competition could cause
real harm to people within the community.
As for loans, Jewish law forbade the payment of interest if both parties
were Jewish." 8 Although parties often found ways to circumvent these
restrictions," 9 the ideal promoted by Jewish law was a cooperative com-
mercial world. Parties were to help others, even competitors, to remain in
business. It was in fact a "mitzvah," a commandment, to make interest-
free loans to poor people to enable them to have a livelihood. 20 Again, the
outlook of Jewish law in this regard was similar to a feminist outlook. The
commandment to make interest-free loans and the prohibition on charging
interest reinforced an approach that emphasized cooperation instead of
competition. They fostered an attitude of responsibility and concern for the
welfare of other individuals instead of an attitude of relating to others as
objects who might be useful in pursuing one's own advantage.
The object of Jewish life was not to become rich.' 2' Although the weekday
prayers included a plea for economic sustenance,' 22 ideally material wealth
would enable its owner or others to engage in the study of Torah.'23 Work
117. TALMUD Bava Batra 21b; S uLHAN AiwruK Hoshen Mishpat 156:3.
118. See TALMUD Bava Metzia 60b et seq.; MisHNEH TORAH Malveh Ve-Loveh 4-10; SH.HMAN
ARuKH Yoreh Deah 160-77.
119. See H. Soloveitchik, Pawnbroking: A Study of Ribbit and of the Halakhah in Exile,
in 38-39 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY FOR JEWISH RESEARCH 203 (1970-71); 16
ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Usury 27, 31 (1972).
120. MISHNEH TORAH Malveh Ve-Loveh 1:1.
121. THE ETHICS OF THE FATHERS 4:1 teaches: "Who is rich? He who rejoices in his
portion." J. HERTZ, supra note 70, at 667; ef. J. NEUSNER, THE ECONoM CS OF THE MISHNAH
72 (1990) (The Mishnah tried to create and maintain a market where no party gained or lost
in any transaction.).
122. See J. HERTZ, supra note 70, at 141-43 ("Bless this year unto us, 0 Lord our God,
together with every kind of produce thereof for our welfare; give a blessing upon the face of
the earth. 0 satisfy us with thy goodness, and bless our year like other good years. Blessed
art thou, 0 Lord, who blessest the years.").
123. According to Rabbi Johanan, a leading Palestinian authority (circa 180-279), all of the
good prophesied by the prophets described only the reward given to one who marries off his
daughter to a scholar, to one who conducts business on behalf of a scholar, and to one who
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was therefore valued'24 but as a means to an end. This ideal was incompatible
with inflicting hurt on others through an unrestrained market. Rather, it
was a "mitzvah," a commandment, to enable one's fellow to live also. The
Jewish community's needs took precedence over an individual's desire to
amass great wealth.
8. The Primacy of Duties
A leading feature of the type of feminist jurisprudence being discussed
here is that it emphasizes responsibility over rights. This priority is consistent
with the Jewish law view.'1 5
Jewish law began with the assumption that its laws emanated from a
command by God.126 A Jew's basic approach to law is that the law is
something that must be observed in order to keep the Jewish community's
bargain with God. Of course, the existence of a duty binding on one person
tends to lead to the recognition of an enforceable right in another party.
But this is not always so. Within Judaism, there is a whole range of religious
observances, prayers, and blessings that a Jew is obliged to perform, and
otherwise benefits a scholar. The reward of a scholar is even greater. TALMUD Berakhot 34b.
The Talmud contains a debate between two Palestinian rabbis who lived before the completion
of the Mishnah, over whether one ought to work and study or only study. Rabbi Ishmael said
that one ought to study and work. As Rashi explained, if one were to be in great need, one
would be unable to study Torah. But Simeon ben Yohai said that when Jews fulfill God's
will their work is done by others, and when they do not fulfill God's will they must work for
themselves and for others. A later Babylonian scholar, Abaye, said that many followed Rabbi
Ishmael's advice and succeeded whereas others followed Rabbi Simeon's advice without
succeeding. Abaye's contemporary, Rava, proposed something of a compromise, advising his
students not to appear before him during the two months necessary for harvesting grain and
pressing olives and grapes so that they would not be troubled about their food supply for the
remainder of the year. TALMUD Berakhot 35b.
The Talmud mentions that the following prayer was said when leaving the house of study:
"I give thanks to you, Lord my God, that you have set my portion with those who sit in the
house of study and you have not set my portion with those who sit in the street corners, for
I rise early and they rise early, but I rise early for words of Torah and they rise early for
frivolous talk; I labor and they labor, but I labor and receive a reward and they labor and
do not receive a reward; I run and they run, but I run to the life of the future world and
they run to the pit of destruction." TALMUD Berakhot 28b. A version of this prayer is said
when a group finishes the study of any of the Talmud's tractates.
124. See, e.g., TALMUD Berakhot 8a ("R. Hiyya bar Ammi further said in the name of
Ulla: A man who lives from the labor of his hands is greater than the one who fears heaven.").
125. See Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J. LAw &
RELIGION 65 (1988); Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 H~Aiv. L. Rav. 306,
312-13 (1961); Weinrib, Rescue and Restitution, I S'vMR 59 (1990).
126. See, e.g., TALMUD Berakhot 5a:
R. Levi b. Hama says further in the name of R. Simeon b. Lakish:
What is the meaning of the verse: "And I will give thee the tables of stone and
the law and the commandment, which I have written that thou mayest teach
them" (Ex. 24:12)? "Tables of stone": these are the ten commandments; "the
law": this is the Pentateuch; "the commandment": this is the Mishnah; "which
I have written": these are the Prophets and the Hagiographa; "that thou mayest
teach them": this is the Gemara. It teaches that all these things were given to
Moses on Sinai.
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this obligation does not confer rights on anyone. A Jew is also under
various religious obligations to take certain precautions that do not create
a right on anyone's part to sue for damages. 127 In some situations, there
are duties in Jewish law that cannot be enforced in an earthly court but
that are enforceable in a heavenly court. 12 Holmes's "bad man" might
conclude that such a law does not bind him to do anything since it can not
be enforced by a visible court.' 29 But to the Jewish mind such a person
would be "bad" in a different sense. Jewish law is premised upon the
acceptance of its belief structure. Within that structure, the belief in divine
justice is taken very seriously indeed.
9. The Duty to Rescue
One feminist scholar has suggested that a feminist jurisprudence would
take the duty to rescue more seriously than does American law. 30 Under
American law, there is generally no duty to rescue a stranger. Liability can
be imposed, however, if a would-be rescuer begins to aid one in distress.'
If the two rules have any effect on behavior, it would be to discourage one
from becoming involved.
By contrast, Jewish law imposed a duty to rescue a stranger or a stranger's
property.3 2 Consistent with the limited range of tort liability available in
Jewish law,'33 there was no tort liability for failure to rescue. But it was
127. For example, there is a duty to rescue one who is drowning or one who is being chased
even though the violation of these duties subjects one to no punishment. See MISHNEH TORAH
Rozeah u-sh'mirat nefesh 1:15-16. See also infra note 132 and accompanying text. Also, even
though it is a positive command to erect a railing around one's roof and around one's wells
in order to protect human life, MISHNEH TORAH Rozeah u-sh'mirat nefesh 11:1-4, liability in
such cases is limited to claims for personal injury and does not include claims for wrongful
death. MISHNEH TORAH Nizkei Mammon 13:1; SHULHAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 410:20. One
is also under an obligation to accompany a guest a certain distance when he takes leave, to
visit the sick, to comfort the bereaved, and to provide for the needy bride. See, e.g., COMMENT
OF JOSHUA FALK, MEIRAT EINAYIM, TO SHn-LHAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 427 n. 11. But there
is no indication in Jewish law that one is liable for damages for any injuries that might occur
from one's violation of these obligations.
128. SIuLHAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 418:7 (One who gives a lighted coal to a legally
incompetent person is liable for resulting damage only in the court of heaven.); SHsuHAN
ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 396:3 (If one knocks down an unsteady fence in the face of an animal
and the animal goes out and causes damage, one is only liable in the court of heaven.);
SHtLHAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 395:1 (Inciting another's dog to bite only imposes liability
in the court of heaven.); SHuLHAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 32:2 (Hiring witnesses to testify
for someone else only makes the hirer liable in the heavenly court.); see also TALMUD Bava
Kamma 55b-56a.
129. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAiv. L. REv. 457 (1897).
130. Bender, supra note 8, at 37.
131. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEaTON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984).
132. SHULHAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 426 (rescue of persons); SHULHAN ARUKH Hoshen
Mishpat 259-71 (return and rescue of lost property).
133. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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considered a grave religious fault not to rescue-one is commanded not to
stand by the blood of one's neighbor.' 34
10. Obligations in Tort Cases
American tort law focuses primarily on deciding when a defendant is
liable. If liability is imposed, it is almost always in the form of money
damages. The law thus allows all forms of injury to be reduced to a
monetary "equivalent" and usually provides that the only obligation of the
tortfeasor is to pay money. It has been suggested that a feminist jurispru-
dence would focus more on a tortfeasor's obligations to care for the person
injured. 135 Where does Jewish law stand on these issues?
Jewish law imposed tort liability in a very narrow range of cases.'
36
Liability for damages was very limited when compared with American law
and when compared with the sweeping language of the Bible. For example,
the case of one who digs a pit in a public way (a paradigm for any obstacle
created in a public place) was addressed under the broad language of the
Biblical rule:
And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit and not cover
it, and an ox or an ass shall fall therein, the owner of the pit shall
make it good and give money unto the owner of them and the dead
beast shall be his. 37
The Talmud limited this liability in several ways. According to the Talmud,
the rule only applied to injuries to animals, not to the death of a person
or the destruction of inanimate objects. And even in the case of an animal,
it only applied to an animal that was unable to see where it was going,
either because it was blind or because the injury occurred at night.3
The Talmud limited tort liability in other ways. For example, there was
an early principle that defendants were strictly liable for injuries caused
134. MISHNEH ToRAH Rozeah u-sh'mirat Nefesh 1:14-16; SHULHAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat
426. The commandment is based on Leviticus 19:16.
The Talmud and post-Talmudic authorities dealt with a range of auxiliary problems such as
the liability for damages caused to others by the person in danger, by the rescuer, and by the
one placing the person in danger. The generally accepted view was that the rescuer of human
life was entitled to compensation for rescue and that the one rescued was liable to pay for
damages to property caused by his rescue. Rosh, Sanhedrin ch. 8; TUR Hoshen Mishpat 426;
see Weinrib, Rescue and Restitution, 1 S'vARA 59 (1990). A leading authority of the 16th
century, Samuel ben Moses De Medina, questioned whether the rescuer ought to be entitled
to reimbursement, since the rescuer acts in his own interest to fulfill the obligation that God
imposed on him. REsPoNsA RAsHDAM Yoreh Deah 204. In the case before him, Medina limited
the right to reimbursement to successful rescues.
135. See Bender, supra note 8, at 37.
136. See Friedell, Some Observations on the Talmudic Law of Torts, 15 RUTroERs L.J. 897
(1984), reprinted in 13-14 DIN ISRAEL 65 (1988).
137. Exodus 21:33-34.
138. TALMuD Bava Kamma 54b.
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directly by the defendant's body. 139 But later sources limited this principle
rather severely by insisting that the plaintiff must be free of fault. 140 More
generally, Jewish law apparently allowed a plaintiff to recover damages in
other types of tort cases (such as where damage was caused by fire, animals,
or obstacles) only when the plaintiff was less at fault than the defendant.' 4'
In the case of injuries caused in an unusual manner by one's animal, the
defendant was liable for only half of the damages. 42 In addition to these
restrictions, Jewish law did not recognize the concept of respondeat
superior. 143
Jewish law severely limited liability to injuries caused very directly by the
defendant. 44 The plaintiff might be able to enjoin the defendant from
engaging in behavior that indirectly caused injury, 145 but damages were not
obtainable. Nor was there a concept of joint and several liability in Jewish
law. '
139. See TALMUD Bava Kamma 26a-26b.
140. See COMMENT OF NACHMANmES To TALMUD Bava Metzia 82b. He takes issue with the
Tosafot, who sought to explain the variety of rules in the Talmud by suggesting that the law
recognized two categories of compulsion. According to the Tosafot, one type of compulsion
is close to negligence and one acting under such compulsion would be liable for causing injury.
The Tosafot maintained that for pure compulsion one is not liable. TosAsoT Bava Kamma
27b (comment beginning "U-Shmuel"). Nachmanides suggests in effect that the Tosafot applied
the two categories of compulsion simply to restate the conclusions reached in the Talmud and
that the Tosafot's analysis does not really explain anything. He suggests instead that plaintiffs
lose tort claims where they are at fault and the defendant is innocent. See generally Haut,
Some Aspects of Absolute Liability Under Jewish Law and Particularly Under the View of
Maimonides, 15 DIN ISRAL 7, 29-31 (1989-90).
141. See Friedell, Liability. Problems in Nezikin: A Reply to Professor Albeck, 15 Dar
ISRAEL 97 (1989-90). In addition to the source cited there, see S. LuIA (circa 1510-1574), YAM
SHEL SHELoMo Bava Kamma 2:29.
142. SmniRAN ARuKH Hoshen Mishpat 389:2.
143. See Hafetz, Vicarious Liability in Jewish Law, 6 Dud IsRAEL 49 (1975) (Hebrew); cf.
REsPONSA RASHBA WICH HAD BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO NACHMANmES 20. The question raised
was whether a principal or a partner could be liable for injuries to an agent or partner who
was injured while engaged in business for the defendant or for the partnership. The answer
was that there was no liability. Tort liability had to be based on either injuries caused by the
defendant himself or for those caused by his negligence in not caring for his property. But in
this case there was no damage caused by the defendant or his negligent care of property.
Nachmanides continues: "If one hired a worker to be a smith, and a spark went out from
under the hammer and burned a stalk belonging to the smith. Would the owner be liable?
[No.] For it was [the employee's] work. And [this is so] even if the worker had [worked]
gratuitously. And even if you say that the injury was caused by the agency, it is a case of
indirect damage and he is exempt." There were very limited circumstances in Jewish law where
a principal could be liable for the injuries inflicted by an agent. The most significant for our
purposes was that bailees were liable for breaches of bailment committed by their agents. See
Kirschenbaum, The Rabbinic Law ofAgency for Illegal Acts, 4 Dnd IsRAEL 55 (1973) (Hebrew).
144. For example it was considered indirect damage if one gave a flickering coal to a minor
who allowed the coal to cause fire damage. TALMUD Bava Kamma 59b. Nor was one liable in
an earthly court for placing poisonous food in front of an animal, even if the food was of
the type that the animal might be expected to eat. TALMUD Bava Kamma 47b. In both cases
the damage was deemed to be only indirectly caused by the defendant.
145. See TAum Bava Batra 22b-23a.
146. See Friedell, supra note 136, at 905.
[Vol. 67:915
JEWISH LA W
The limited liability of Jewish tort law fit in well with other legal and
social institutions. The Jewish law rules of tort developed before liability
insurance. Since plaintiffs were probably as capable of bearing a loss as
defendants, the system of limited liability seemed less harsh than it might
in a modern context. The law considered people to be responsible for their
own safety. The rule limiting liability to cases where the defendant was
more at fault reflected this concern. Also, when the law made a defendant
liable for half of the damages, it effected a type of loss sharing between
the parties. Beyond that, the system of tort law was administered within a
framework of compromise, and one can presume that in many cases the
courts allowed some payment to an injured plaintiff. Furthermore, Jewish
law gave individuals power to enjoin defendants from engaging in dangerous
activity. Finally, Jewish law recognized that certain kinds of injuries were
subject to divine justice but not to redress in an earthly court. In sum,
Jewish law was more interested in preventing harm than in shifting the
losses of unintentional injuries that had already occurred. This focus is
consistent with the goals of a feminist jurisprudence.
The effects of limited liability in Jewish tort law were also moderated by
the extensive network of charitable funds available within the Jewish com-
munity. The giving of charity was a "mitzvah," a commandment. The
Hebrew word for charity is "zedakah," which means justice, and the giving
of charity was an obligation that could be enforced in court. 47 The mitzvah
was not merely to provide a meager existence for the poor, but to compen-
sate a member of the community for his losses. 4 All within the community,
even the poor, were required to give charity. 49 Charitable organizations
provided the poor with a range of services including gifts of money, interest-
free loans, food, clothing, medical care, visits to the sick, education,
provisions for dowerless brides, ritual articles, and free burial. 50 Charity
was to be given also to non-Jews in order to foster peace.1 5 1 When seen in
this context, the limited liability of Jewish tort law was only one way in
which the community provided for the needs of its members.
Jewish law did not go as far as some feminist scholars might advocate
in terms of making tortfeasors assume responsibility for caring for the
147. MISHNEH ToRAH Mattenot Aniyyim 7:3.
148. The Talmud relates that an old man once came before Rava in need of charity. He
told Rava that he usually had fat chicken and old wine for his meal. When Rava objected
that this might burden the community, the man pointed out that all property belongs to God.
At that point Rava's sister happened to appear with a present for Rava of a fat chicken and
some old wine. Rava apologized and invited the man to eat with him. TMmuD Ketubot 67b.
149. Charity consisting of a tenth of one's assets was considered an average gift; to give as
much as a fifth was considered praiseworthy; to give less than a tenth was miserly. MismmNH
ToRAR Mattenot Aniyyim 7:5.
150. See 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Charity 338, 345-48 (1972).
151. M smHNE ToRAH Mattenot Aniyyim 7:7.
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people they injure. But Jewish law did seek to limit dangerous activities
and to foster a community that cared for its members.
•11. The Importance of the Community
In addition to the obligation to provide charity, there were numerous
other ways in which Jewish law fostered a commitment to the community
and its members. Jewish teachings warned a Jew not to separate from the
community.1 2 Even greater than charity was the concept of "gemilut has-
adim," performing acts of loving kindness."' It is said to be one of the
pillars on which the world stands. 5 4 The commandment to perform such
acts applied not only to gifts of money, but also to personal service. One
was obligated to help not only the poor. Acts of loving kindness were due
the wealthy and even the dead.'55
Judaism taught that every Jew had some responsibility for the conduct
of every other Jew. There was a duty to try to prevent others from violating
a commandment. 56 Jewish religious practices and beliefs fostered this atti-
tude of mutual responsibility. Jews recited most prayers in the plural because
they believed that God would answer a personal petition only if it included
the needs of others.' For a similar reason, the confessions that a Jew
makes on Yom Kippur are recited in the plural; one confesses not only for
one's own sins but for those of the community.' Similarly, in a commonly
used hyperbolic style, the Talmud taught that a Jew's prayers were only
heard when said in a synagogue.) 9 Not only was the .place of prayer
important, but the act of praying as a group was significant. 160 The Talmud
taught that one who finished his prayers and left the synagogue while
another was praying alone had prayed in vain. 161
152. ETmcs OF THE FATHERS 2:5.
153. TALMUD Sukkah 49b; see 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Gemilut Hasadim 374 (1972).
154. ETmCs OF THE FATiERS 1:2. The other pillars are Torah and worship. Id.
155. TALMuD Sukkah 49b; see 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Gemilut Hasadim 374 (1972). One
bestows acts of loving kindness on the dead by providing for and attending their funeral.
156. TALMUD Shevuot 37a-b; see also TALMUD Sanhedrin 27b. The expression used is that
all Jews are sureties for one another.
157. TALMuD Berakhot 29b-30a.
158. See P. BiRNBAuM, HIGH HOLYDAY PRAYER BOOK 510 (1951).
159. TALMuD Berakhot 6a.
160. As Judith Plaskow has observed, "While many feminists may no longer be able to
participate comfortably in such community, traditional Jewish worship certainly can create
community among the participants. In addition, the accepted lack of decorum in many
traditional synagogues testifies to the important relational function worship serves." J. PLAs-
Kow, supra note 29, at 68.
Rashi suggests that there are three steps necessary for the formation of a community that
can pray as one. There must be pleasant speech followed by the seeking of advice followed
by an invitation. Rashi's Commentary on TALMUD Berakhot 42b (comment beginning "Bedun
plan").
161. TALMuD Berakhot 5b. The Talmud says that his prayers are torn up in his face.
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The Jewish mystical tradition further reinforced the connection that the
individual was expected to feel toward the community. Within the Jewish
mystical tradition, observance of a commandment not only affected the
status of the individual, but also had a redemptive effect on the world and
even on God. 62 The ultimate aim of the Jewish mystic, to obtain an intimate
attachment to God, could be achieved through observance of those com-
mandments that are applicable to everyday living. 63 Jewish mysticism thus
strengthened the law's aim of making people feel responsible for one
another.
12. The Pursuit of Peace
The rabbis in the Talmud emphasized the importance of peace. 64 The
rabbinic sources taught that: the purpose of the study of Torah was to
increase peace in the world; 65 peace was one of the divine gifts to the
world;' 66 peace was one of the things that sustains the world; 67 the name
of the Messiah was peace;1es the name of God may be blotted out if
necessary to restore peace between man and wife; 169 indeed, one of the
names of God was peace; 70 and one who loved peace and pursued it was
to inherit this world and the world to come.' The rabbis minimized the
militaristic elements in Jewish history, attributing these victories to God,
not to the ability of Jewish armies. 72
162. See G. SCHOLEM, MAJOR TRENDS IN JEWISH MYSTICISM 233 (1941).
163. Id. at 233-34.
164. See Glatzer, The Concept of Peace in Classical Judaism, in DER FRIEDE: IDEE UND
VERWIRKLICHUNG (THE SEARCH FOR PEACE) 27 (E. Fromm & H. Herzfeld, eds. 1961).
165. TALMUD Berakhot 64a; see also TAnuD Kidushin 30b (Those who study Torah together
will start to hate each other but inevitably will love each other; the study of Torah protects
one from the attractions of the evil impulse.).
166. Leviticus Rabbah 35:7.
167. ETHICS OF THE FATHERS 1:18.
168. PEREK HA-SHALOM para. 11 (printed as an addendum to Derekh Eretz Zuta, one of
the minor tractates of the TAnmur).
169. PEREK HA-SHALOM para. 9. The reference is to the blotting out of God's name in the
ritual described in Numbers 5:11-31, which concerns a wife accused of unfaithfulness.
170. Id. para. 11.
171. Id. para. 19.
172. For example, the Hanukkah celebrations focus on the miracle of the menorah that
burned for eight days even though there was only enough oil for one day. The prayers on
Hanukkah stress that the victory over the Syrians was due to God's mercy in delivering "the
strong into the hands of the weak, the many into the hands of the few, the impure into the
hands of the pure, the wicked into the hands of the righteous, and the arrogant into the hands
of them that occupied themselves with thy Torah." J. HERTZ, supra note 70, at 153. In
addition, on the Sabbath during Hanukkah the rabbis instituted as the reading of the Haftorah
(a section of the prophets read after the reading of the Torah) a portion of Zechariah which
includes a vision of menorah which the prophet is told means "Not by might, nor by power,
but by my spirit, saith the Lord of hosts." Zechariah 4:6; see J. HERTZ, THE PENTATEUCH
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One thread binding the various topics discussed in this Article is that
they all aim at promoting peace. For example, the emphasis of Jewish law
on promoting compromise rather than litigation according to strict law was
expressly for the reason of promoting peace. 17 The Talmudic rabbis sought
to exclude lawyers from the litigation process because it was thought that
they would interfere with the peaceful resolution of disputes.17 4 The rabbis
in the post-Talmudic period transformed the formalistic procedural rules so
as to promote peace. 75 A community was to appoint men of compassion
to be judges. 17 6 The Talmudic law shunned a competitive market.'" And
each member of the community had a duty to look out for the other
members' welfare.' s7 The religious practices and the belief structure of the
Jews constantly reinforced these- attitudes. During the ceremonies following
the reading of the Torah in the synagogue, the congregation twice recites
the verse from Proverbs, "Its ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its
paths are peace.' 79
CONCLUSION
For the reader who has travelled this far, it is obvious that a feminist
jurisprudence based on Carol Gilligan's approach has much in common
with Jewish law. Both emphasize responsibility and relationships instead of
insisting on rights and adhering to strict law.
One implication of these similarities is that within Jewish law a common
thread connects the procedure and substance. The entire body of Jewish
law can be understood as pursuing the religious ideal of peace. In pursuing
peace, a person recognizes the obligations to others within the community.
An implication of this study for the student of feminist jurisprudence is
to question the assumption that certain values of peace, community, and
responsibility derive from some feature of the female personality that is
AND HAFTo.AHs 989 (2d ed. 1988).
Similarly, Jacob suggested that part of Joseph's inheritance would be increased because
Jacob had won a military victory. Jacob told Joseph, "I assign to you one portion more than
to your brothers, which I wrested from the Amorites with my sword and bow." Genesis 48:22.
But the Talmud juxtaposed his claim with a verse in Psalms, "I do not trust in my bow; it
is not my sword that gives me victory." Psalms 44:7. The Talmud resolved the tension by
saying that by "sword and bow," Jacob meant prayer and supplication. TAmuD Bava Batra
123a.
173. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
174. See supra text accompanying note 94.
175. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
176. See supra text accompanying note 69.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 105-16.
178. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 156.
179. J. HERTZ, supra note 70, at 193, 197. The verse is in Proverbs 3:17. The Talmud
explains this verse to mean that the whole Torah was given to promote the ways of peace.
TALmuD Gitin 59b. See A. KiRSCHENBAuM, supra note 36, at 152.
[Vol. 67:915
JEWISH LA W
either natural or due to the psychological effect on boys and girls of being
raised primarily by women in early childhood. Jewish law was developed
almost exclusively by men, and there is no reason to doubt that Jewish
men left the primary responsibility for raising young children to women. 180
It would seem, therefore, that the development of the values of Jewish law
and feminist jurisprudence does not emanate from some natural difference
between men and women. Feminists should conclude therefore that em-
bracing values of connection, caring, and responsibility will not necessarily
reinforce a stereotyping of women.
A second implication for feminist jurisprudence is that the mere fact that
"a different voice" generates the law does not guarantee that the law will
empower women. Jewish law protected women, and it imposed on men several
obligations for the support and satisfaction of women. However, Jewish law
also subordinated women.' Men were obligated to provide for their wives'
maintenance during and after marriage, 112 to satisfy their wives' sexual desires,'
180. In case of divorce, children-girls of all ages and boys under the age of six-were
generally placed in the care of the mother. A divorced man could refuse to support his son
over the age of six unless the son was placed in his custody. SHILHAN ARUKH Even Ha-ezer
82:7. It was generally considered better to have a son than to have a daughter. See, e.g.,
TALMUD Berakhot 31a; MmiRAsH TANHumA Hayei Sarah. But if the first child was a girl, this
was a good sign because she could help raise the other children. TALMUD Bava Batra 141a.
See generally 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Parent and Child 95, 98 (1972).
181. Maimonides says that a woman is to honor her husband greatly and look on him as
a king or lord, she is to do whatever he tells her, and she is to follow his desires and stay
away from what he hates. MisHNaN TORAH Ishut 15:20. For a critical view of the way Jewish
law treated women see, for example, J. PLsKow, supra note 29; L. SwmLER, WOMEN IN
JUDAISM: THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN FORMATIVE JuDAIsM (1976); Adler, The Jew Who Wasn't
There: Halakhah and the Jewish Woman, 7 REsPONSE 77 (Summer 1973), reprinted in S.
HESCHEL, ON BEING A JEWISH FEMIMS 12 (1983); Hyman, The Other Half. Women in the
Jewish Tradition, in Tan JEvISH WOMAN 105 (E. Koltun ed. 1976). For a more sympathetic
view see, for example, T. FRANCIEL, Tan VOICE OF SARAH: FEmumE SPnuTuALrrY AND
TRADIoNAL JUrAIsM (1990); M. MEISEt.AN, JEwISH Wo IN JEWIsH LAW (1978); Berman,
The Status of Women in Halakhic Judaism, in Tan JE WSH WoMAN, supra, at 114. For an
effort to improve the status of women within traditional Jewish law, see B. GREENBERG, ON
WOMEN AND JUDAIsM (1981).
182. SmnouLH ARuKH Even Ha-ezer 70 (food); SHuIHN ARuKH Even Ha-ezer 73 (clothing).
183. SHULHAN AguKH Even Ha-ezer 76. The obligation included the performance of inter-
course on a regular basis, the frequency of which depended on the husband's ability to be at
home. For example, regular laborers were obligated to provide their wives with sexual
intercourse twice a week, laborers who worked in another city were only expected to have
intercourse once a week. Scholars were also expected to have intercourse once a week. SHUuIA-.!
ARUKH Even Ha-ezer 76:2. These were minimum amounts that could be increased if the wife
indicated her desire. SHuLHAN ARIu Orah Hayim 240:1. In addition, the husband was
obligated to have intercourse on the night that his wife had gone to the ritual bath and on
the night before he took an out-of-town trip. SHuHAN ABUKH Even Ha-ezer 76:4. A wife
could prevent her husband from changing his employment if that would reduce the frequency
of his obligation. SHIuiA ARuicH Even Ha-ezer 76:5. However, one could become a scholar
without his wife's permission. SHuLnAN ARUKH Even Ha-ezer 76:5. The Talmud recognized
that women as well as men derive pleasure from sexual intercourse. See, e.g., TALMUD Bava
Kamma 32a; TALMUD Kidushin 22b; RAsHI ON TALMUD Eruvin 100b (comment beginning
"Yiv'ol"). For purposes of liability for injuries caused during intercourse, only the husband
was considered to be the active party and therefore liable. TALMUD Bava Kamma 32a.
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and to treat their wives with respect.3 4 But only men could become rabbis
and judges. 85 Also, because' the law obligated only men to testify as
witnesses, 86 it generally allowed only men to serve as witnesses. 187 Similarly,
because the law required only men to say certain prayers, 18  only men could
make up the "minyan," or quorum necessary for community prayer, and
only men could lead such prayers. 89 The law exempted women from the
duty of studying Torah,' 90 but society expected women to encourage men
184. The Talmud says that a man ought to love his wife as much as his own body and that
he ought to honor her more than his own body. TALMUD Ketubot 62b; cf. Epiphany. 5:28
("So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth
himself."). Maimonides sums up the Talmudic rules by saying that a man is also to avoid
being harsh or angry with his wife. He is supposed to speak pleasantly to her. He is also to
spend as much money as he is able to for her welfare. Mism'H- TORAH Ishut 15:19.
A man was generally liable for any physical injury that he directly caused his wife. SmnMuri
Aausr{ Even Ha-ezer 83:1. A man was strictly liable for damages if he hurt his wife during
intercourse. SHULAN ARURH Even Ha-ezer 83:2. A man was supposed to have intercourse
with his wife only after talking with her and while both were happy. M1SHNEH TORAH Ishut
15:17. He could not force his wife to have intercourse against her will. Sm.n.LH ARuKH Even
Ha-ezer 25:2. Nor could he have intercourse if either party was angry with the other or if
either party was drunk. SHuLKAN ARuKH Even Ha-ezer 25:8-9. A man's intentions and thoughts
during intercourse were not to increase his own pleasure but to fulfill his obligation to his
wife and to his creator to bring children into the world who would study Torah and fulfill
the commandments. SHuHaAN ARuKr Even Ha-ezer 25:2.
185. See supra note 65; see also R. GoRDis, THm DY AMICS OF JUDAISm 171-84 (1990)
(arguing that although there were no women rabbis before the twentieth century the law should
now change).
186. TALMUD Shevuot 30a.
187. SmPuLAN ARuxH Hoshen Mishpat 35:14. See generally 16 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA
Witness 584, 586 (1972). The exclusion from testimony had a number of exceptions and
qualifications. Jewish law made a firm distinction between pleading and testimony. Women
could plead as parties, and parties were not allowed to testify in their own case. Cf. Enker,
supra note 80, at 112 (distinguishing between pleading and testifying). The exclusion of women
from testifying only applied to formal testimony. Women could provide the judges with
information about the credibility of parties who were subject tp an oath. TALMUD Ketubot
85a. In some cases involving only a religious prohibition but ndt money damages, the rabbis
allowed the testimony of a single witness, even a female witness. See 2 TALMUDIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
252 (1976) (Hebrew). In some of these cases the testimony would benefit a woman. For
example, the testimony of one witness that a married man had died was usually sufficient.
SHULHAN ARuCH Even Ha-ezer 17:3-4. Similarly, a single witness could testify to the validity
of a "halizah" ceremony, which freed a childless widow from having to marry her brother-
in-law. SsuLHAN ARUKH Even Ha-ezer 169:8. And the strict rule excluding their testimony
was softened when no other witnesses were likely to be available. GLOSS OF MosEs IssEaass TO
SHULHAN ARUKIH Hoshen Mishpat 35:14.
188. E.g., TALMUD Berakhot 20a-b (Women are exempt from having to say the "Sh'ma"
and from having to put on tefilin.). Tefilin are a pair of boxes containing parchment scrolls
of selected Biblical verses. During weekday morning prayers, one of the tefilin is worn on the
head and the other is worn on the left bicep. See H. WourK, Tins Is MY GOD 138 (1959).
189. SinrLHAN ARUSH Orah Hayim 55:1 (ten men needed for "kaddish," "kedushah," and
"barehu"); see A. WEiss, WOMEN AT PRAYER: A HALACKmC ANALYSIS OF WOMEN'S PRAYER
GROUPS 43-56 (1990); Berman, supra note 181, at 122.
190. SHurLAN ARUKH Yoreh Deah 246:6; TALMUD Kidushin 29b. As a result of this lack
of obligation, there were periods when many Jewish women did not understand Hebrew at
all. See ToSAFOT Berakhot 45b (comment beginning "Shani"). See also Baskin, Jewish Women
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to study Torah.19' Jewish society treated women as being different from
men. They were, at best, as one modem authority has put it, "separate but
equal.'
192
Catherine MacKinnon has suggested that women have adopted the values
of the "different voice" because they have been oppressed by men. 91 She
may be right. But the Jewish experience would suggest that oppression does
not necessarily end when the males in society adopt the values of the
different voice. The males in Jewish society dominated women despite the
adoption by those males of the different voice in dealing with much of
society and law. 19 The Jewish experience would suggest that the oppression
of women in Western society may not be due to men's failure to speak
with a different voice.
How does it happen that a legal system that is otherwise so much in tune
with a feminist jurisprudence offends so much that is part of feminism? I
cannot provide a full answer. Part of the answer may be that in ancient
times child rearing and homemaking were activities that women pursued for"
most, if not all, of their adult lives. This left insufficient time for the study
of Torah, and the study of Torah was central to Jewish male society.
Another part of the answer may be that any society that adopts a
jurisprudence that emphasizes obligations and relationships must still deter-
mine who is to be a full member of the community. There will always be
some who are unwilling or unable to participate fully in the community.
Society might try to extend the boundaries of the community to include
more types of people. 19 But at some point society has to exclude someone
in the Middle Ages, in JEwIsH WoMN N HisroRucAL PERSPECTiVE 94, 106 (J. Baskin ed.
1991). Many modern authorities require Jewish women to be given a Jewish education in those
areas relating to her tasks in the home. See M. MEISELmAN, supra note 181, at 39-41. There
were exceptional instances of women who were learned in Jewish law. The most outstanding
example is Beruryah who lived in the second century. See supra note 18. The Talmud also
occasionally attributes legal arguments to Biblical women. For example, Hanna is said to have
argued on legal grounds with God that she ought to bear a child. TALMUD Berakhot 31b.
There was no objection to women teaching Torah. See supra note 65.
191. For example, the TALMUD Berakhot 17a teaches that the reward promised to women
is greater than that given to men. Why? Because they send their sons to the synagogue to
learn Torah, send their husbands to the house of study to learn Mishna, and wait for their
husbands until they return from the academy.
192. A. ST-iNs~ALz, THE EssENTIAL TALMUD 144 (1976); see also M. FENsTEmN, 6 IGROT
MosHE 80 (1982/83) (In this responsum concerning women's liberation, Rabbi Feinstein
maintains that women and men have equal degrees of holiness but that women are naturally
better suited to raise children, which is the most important work as far as God and Torah
are concerned.).
193. See supra note 8.
194. Cf. D. RHODE, JUsTIcE AND GENDER 312 (1989) (making a similar observation about
women in Japanese society).
195. See M. MNow, MAXNO ALL THE DERENCE (1990).
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or something from full membership. Some people will lack the resources of
time or money necessary to participate actively in the community's affairs.
Others will lack the maturity, experience, or commitment to the society's
values to be able to assume all of the responsibilities and rights of being a
full member. Within Jewish society women did not generally have the time
necessary to commit to a rigorous study of Torah.
These are not satisfying answers because one might wonder why adult
Jewish males did not share child rearing with women and allow them to
take an equal role in Torah study. It seems that the social forces that kept
women in the role of primary care giver and homemaker overcame the
communitarian spirit of the law. But in any society, as economic and social
conditions change and as people's concepts of equality and difference evolve,
the social status of its members is likely to change. When this occurs, what
once seemed natural or acceptable may no longer be.
To return to MacKinnon's point, it is possible that the different voice
within Jewish law may have developed because of oppression by outside
forces. Jews were systematically discriminated against during the period
when these values developed. The oppression forced the members of the
community to look primarily to the community for support and care. But
even if oppression was the cause of the development of these values, one
can still determine that the values are good ones.
The more difficult issue is whether these values can be implemented in a
legal system in the absence of oppression. As the systematic oppression of
Jews in Western Europe eased after the eighteenth century and as Jews
there came to see themselves as citizens of the countries in which they lived,
the Jewish legal system underwent a dramatic decline. Moreover, the history
of Jewish law suggests that the communitarian ideals of Jewish law were
frequently in competition with other models of behavior. Jewish courts
increasingly handled cases brought by lawyers. Jews found ways to circum-
vent the prohibition of charging interest to other Jews. And as Jews resorted
to non-Jewish courts for relief, the values inherent within Jewish law were
not always observed. But it would seem that oppression is not necessary
for the development of these values. What is necessary is a commitment to
communal values. When the society at large does not share these values,
what is needed is a commitment to separate from the society at large.
Oppression can make it possible for a group to develop that commitment,
but that commitment can also be generated internally. Developing that
commitment and sustaining it in the face of opportunities to develop more
selfish forms of behavior is no easy task. 9 6
196. See also Williams, Feminism's Search for the Feminine: Essentialism, Utopianism, and
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 700, 708 (1989) (Communitarianism can devalue diversity.).
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An important distinction between rabbinic law and feminist jurisprudence
is that the former is a religious legal system while the latter is secular. The
religious dimension of Jewish law has helped to sustain it over much of the
past two thousand years. Also, because of their religious authority, individ-
ual rabbis were often able to lead the people and impose a structure of
communal values on them. On the other hand, as Jews in the modern
world increasingly found themselves alienated from the older forms of
organized religion, the ability of Jewish law to function declined. The
challenge for a feminist jurisprudence will be to promote and sustain its
values in a hostile environment without the advantages and disadvantages
of being tied to a religious movement.

